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INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CRISIS: CHALLENGES POSED BY THE NEW 
TERRORISM AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR 
John F. Murphy 
The theme of this conference is “International Law in Crisis.” Two 
prime examples of the challenges facing international law and international 
institutions are the so-called “new terrorism” and the changing nature of 
war. In contrast to the “old terrorism” the new terrorism, which is reli-
giously inspired, is increasingly willing to kill large numbers of people and 
to make no distinctions between military and civilian targets. Moreover, as 
demonstrated most vividly by al-Qaeda, which is reported to operate in a 
network that spans roughly one hundred countries, the new terrorism has 
become a global threat rather than a threat located primarily in one coun-
try.  
Prior to the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, international 
terrorism had been treated primarily as a criminal law matter with empha-
sis placed on preventing the commission of the crime through intelligence 
or law enforcement means, or, if prevention failed, on the apprehension, 
prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators. After September 11th, 
however, the criminal justice approach was de-emphasized and, to a con-
siderable extent, supplanted by the use of military means.  
  
  Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. I am grateful for the excellent 
research assistance of Bernard G. Dennis and Megan E. O’Rourke, both second year students 
at Villanova University School of Law, on this essay. At the outset of my essay, let me take 
this opportunity to commend Professor Michael P. Scharf and the other organizers of the 
2011 Frederick K. Cox International Law Center Symposium for choosing the topic, “Inter-
national Law in Crisis.” International law scholars and practitioners have generally been 
reluctant to recognize that international law and some of the primary international institutions 
created by the international legal process, such as the United Nations, the North American 
Treaty Organization (NATO), and the International Court of Justice, are in crisis. On the 
contrary, a triumphalist sentiment is present among some international law specialists, espe-
cially those in the academy. It is possible, however, to paint a considerably less rosy picture. 
There are disquieting signs that international law and international institutions face a prob-
lematic future. Elsewhere, I have focused on five specific topical areas which, in my view, 
are among the most important and most challenging faced by the international community: 
the maintenance of international peace and security; the law of armed conflict; arms control, 
disarmament and non-proliferation; human rights; and international environmental issues. 
See JOHN F. MURPHY, THE EVOLVING DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: HARD CHOICES 
FOR THE WORLD COMMUNITY (2010). For a road map through the book, see the review by 
David P. Stewart, Recent Books on International Law, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 688 (2010). 
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This shift to the military model of counter-terrorism has engendered 
considerable controversy. Supporters of the military model contend that 
criminal law is “too weak a weapon” and that it was inadequate to stop al-
Qaeda from planning and carrying out the attacks of September 11th. Crit-
ics argue that it is unnecessary and threatens fundamental human rights. 
They suggest that normal law enforcement measures can effectively combat 
the threat of terrorism. Moreover, a decision to employ the military model 
of counter-terrorism in place of the law enforcement model, or vice-versa, 
may have serious functional consequences, which are considered in this 
article.  
Use of the U.S. military to kill Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, in 
his heavily fortified Abbottabad compound in Pakistan was sharply criti-
cized by various sources and outraged the Pakistani government and many 
of its people. It was equally strongly defended by the U.S. government, es-
pecially by the Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State, Harold Koh, 
who assessed the killing under the law of armed conflict and not under in-
ternational human rights law.  
As to the changing nature of war and its impact, World War II is a 
classic example of an international armed conflict between sovereign states, 
and the United Nations was set up primarily to prevent such a conflict in the 
future. But international armed conflicts currently constitute a small mi-
nority of all conflicts, and have been replaced by internal or non-
international armed conflicts in the form of insurgencies, civil wars and 
terrorist attacks. These non-international armed conflicts are also examples 
of asymmetric warfare, which features armed hostilities in which one party 
to the conflict endeavors to compensate for its military or other deficiencies 
by resorting to the use of means of warfare that clearly violate the law of 
armed conflict or other rules of public international law. Examples of such 
means of warfare include the deliberate targeting of civilians, the slaughter 
of hostages, the embedding of fighters in the civilian population, and the use 
of human shields, especially civilians. What is particularly disturbing about 
asymmetric warfare is that violators of the law of armed conflict gain con-
siderable military advantage in many instances by the adoption of such tac-
tics because they can be extremely effective in countering the normally vast-
ly superior capabilities of the other party, including in particular those of 









File: Murphy 2 Created on: 4/3/2012 6:50:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:56:00 PM 
2011] CHALLENGES 61 
I.  INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 61 
II.  THE “NEW TERRORISM” AND ITS IMPACT ............................................. 61 
A.  The “New Terrorism” ..................................................................... 63 
B. Impact of the New Terrorism .......................................................... 66 
C. The Legality of the Killing of Osama bin Laden ............................. 67 
III. THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR AND ITS IMPACT .............................. 72 
A. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) ................................................ 80 
B. The Arab Spring .............................................................................. 83 
C. The Ivory Coast and R2P ................................................................ 87 
IV.  CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 91 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this essay, my focus is on two developments which have raised 
especially difficult challenges for the maintenance of international peace 
and security and the law of armed conflict. These are the evolution of inter-
national terrorism over a number of years to the point where one can speak 
confidently of a “new terrorism” and the closely related phenomenon of the 
changing nature of war. In combination, I believe, these two developments 
have created grave difficulties for the international community in general 
and for the U.S. in particular. Failure to resolve these difficulties could 
cause the international legal system to become increasingly dysfunctional 
with respect to efforts to maintain international peace and security and to 
develop the law of armed conflict and raise real and growing doubts about 
its relevance to the conduct of international relations.  
II. THE “NEW TERRORISM” AND ITS IMPACT   
Although now dated, the trenchant observation of the late Richard 
Baxter, Professor of Law at Harvard University and Judge on the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, published in 1974, has stood the test of time: “We 
have cause to regret that a legal concept of ‘terrorism’ was ever inflicted 
upon us. The term is imprecise; it is ambiguous; and above all, it serves no 
operative legal purpose.”1 But above all, the hard school of experience has 
shown, it has constituted, and continues to constitute, a major barrier to ef-
forts to combat the criminal acts often loosely described as “terrorism.”  
In practice, politicians and diplomats have used the terms “terror-
ism” and “terrorists” as labels to pin on their enemies. The cliché: “One 
man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” is a notorious reflection of 
this game of semantics.2 It also reflects a serious conflict of values between 
  
 1 R.R. Baxter, A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism, 7 AKRON L. REV. 380, 380 
(1974). 
 2 Boaz Ganor, Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?, 3 POLICE PRAC. 
& RES. 287, 287 (2002). 
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those who believe that the end always justifies the means and those who do 
not. Thus, in the current environment especially, there are those, apparently 
increasing dramatically in number, who, in an effort to reach their end or 
goal, are perfectly willing to engage in the deliberate targeting and massive 
slaughter of civilians, employ suicide bombers, use children as shields, and 
behead helpless hostages before a worldwide audience. This clash of fun-
damental values has been a major factor contributing to the international 
community’s failure to define terrorism as a legal concept. The U.N. and 
other international fora remain unable to set forth comprehensive anti-
terrorism resolutions because they have not defined the term.3  
Some countries believe that terrorists’ political motivations are rel-
evant to this definitional problem.4 For example, the position of some gov-
ernments has been, “that individual acts of violence can be defined as terror-
ism only if they are employed solely for personal gain or caprice; acts 
committed in connection with a political cause, especially against colonial-
ism and for national liberation, fall outside the definition and constitute le-
gitimate measures of self-defense.”5 Another method to defining terrorism 
has been to define it as such only when such terror is used by governments, 
or so-called “state terrorism.”6 
To be sure, attempting to define terrorism has been a favorite activi-
ty of academic scholars,7 but their efforts have not led to success at the in-
ternational level.8 In his treatise, Wayne McCormack examines a “welter of 
definitions” and based on this examination, suggests some common features 
  
 3 See, e.g., John F. Murphy, Challenges of the “New Terrorism,” in ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 281, 282 (David Armstrong ed., 2009) (providing ex-
amples of why the U.N. has been unable to agree on a definition of terrorism). 
 4 John F. Murphy, The Future of Multilateralism and Efforts to Combat International 
Terrorism, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 35, 38 (1986).
 
 5 Id.  
 6 Id. For example, the word “terror” was first used in conjunction with the Jacobin “Reign 
of Terror” during the French Revolution. See ALBERT SOBOUL, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 
1780–1799, at 385 (1975). 
 7 For some recent writings on the issue of defining terrorism, see Louis Rene Beres, The 
Legal Meaning of Terrorism for the Military Commander, 11 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (1995) 
(explaining the diminishing meaning of the word terrorism); Susan Tiefenbrun, A Semiotic 
Approach to a Legal Definition of Terrorism, 9 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 357 (2003) (outlin-
ing approaches to a legal definition of terrorism); Grenville Byford, The Wrong War, 81 
FOREIGN AFF. 34 (2002) (looking to an appropriate definition of the title “terrorist”); and 
Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism in International Law and its 
Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 23 (2006) 
(examining how the definition of terrorism has evolved). 
 8 For extensive discussion of the obstacles to reaching agreement on a definition of terror-
ism, see John F. Murphy, Defining International Terrorism: A Way Out of the Quagmire, 19 
ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 13 (1989) (extensively discussing the obstacles to reaching agree-
ment on a definition of terrorism). 
File: Murphy 2 Created on: 4/3/2012 6:50:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:56:00 PM 
2011] CHALLENGES 63 
found in most of them. Applying these common features, McCormack pos-
its that, “Generally, a terrorist: (1) is a civilian or subnational group who; 
(2) uses violence; (3) against civilians; (4) for political motivations.”9 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the international community’s ina-
bility to agree on a definition of terrorism, and despite the many practical 
problems definitions of terrorism pose, national legal systems, including 
that of the U.S., have adopted a number of definitions for a variety of pur-
poses.10 For present purposes, one might consider the definition of “interna-
tional terrorism” that appears in the U.S. federal crime code’s chapter on 
terrorism.11 According to this definition,  
“International terrorism” means activities that -  
(A)  involve violent acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a viola-
tion if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any 
State; 
(B)  appear to be intended - 
 (i)  to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;  
 (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coer-
cion; or  
 (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assas-
sination, or kidnapping; and  
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States 
or national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accom-
plished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the lo-
cale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
12
 
With this brief background to some of the definitional problems of 
terrorism, let us consider some of the salient aspects of the “new terrorism.”  
A.  The “New Terrorism” 
Back in the (relatively) halcyon days of the “old terrorism,” the 
conventional wisdom suggested that terrorists had little interest in killing 
large numbers of people. The perception was that large-scale killings would 
undermine their efforts to gain sympathy for their cause, which was usually 
to overthrow the government of a particular country (e.g., Germany or Ita-
  
 9 WAYNE MCCORMACK, LEGAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 3 (2nd ed. 2009). 
 10 See BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT 615–21 (2nd ed. 2010) (providing a variety of definitions of terrorism or 
terrorist acts, drawn from a variety of national and international sources). 
 11 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2011). 
 12 Id.  
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ly).13 An especially disquieting aspect of the new terrorism is the increased 
willingness of terrorists to kill large numbers of people and to make no dis-
tinction between military and civilian targets.14 A major cause of this radical 
change in attitude has been aptly pinpointed by Jeffrey D. Simon: 
Al Qaeda . . . is representative of the emergence of the religious-inspired 
terrorist groups that have become the predominant form of terrorism in re-
cent years. One of the key differences between religious-inspired terrorists 
and politically motivated ones is that the religious-inspired terrorists have 
fewer constraints in their minds about killing large numbers of people. All 
nonbelievers are viewed as the enemy, and the religious terrorists are less 
concerned than political terrorists about a possible backlash from their 
supporters if they kill large numbers of innocent people. The goal of the 
religious terrorist is transformation of all society to their religious beliefs, 
and they believe that killing infidels or nonbelievers will result in their be-
ing rewarded in the afterlife. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda’s goal was to drive 
U.S. and Western influences out of the Middle East and help bring to pow-
er radical Islamic regimes around the world. In February 1998, bin Laden 
and allied groups under the name “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against 
the Jews and the Crusaders” issued a fatwa, which is a Muslim religious 
order, stating that it was the religious duty of all Muslims to wage a war on 
U.S. citizens, military and civilian, anywhere in the world.
15
  
Another facet of the new terrorism is the extraordinary extent to 
which terrorists have developed global networks. A recent study finds that 
al-Qaeda operates in a network that spans roughly one hundred countries, 
including the U.S.16 While that network has weakened severely in recent 
years with the assassination or capture of key al-Qaeda leaders such as 
Osama bin Laden, the organization has simultaneously gained many new 
militants to its cause through a “terror by franchise” approach.17 That is, 
while the Jihadi threat has been suppressed in some countries (e.g., Saudi 
Arabia and Indonesia) it is increasing in places in North Africa and Leba-
non. Groups inspired by al-Qaeda have in turn established links with a new 
breed of home-grown terrorist. The problem is especially acute in the Unit-
  
 13 See MCCORMACK, supra note 9, at 6; REX A. HUDSON, FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM: WHO BECOMES A 
TERRORIST AND WHY? (Marilyn Majeska ed., 1999). 
 14 See PETER L. BERGEN, HOLY WAR, INC.: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF OSAMA BIN 
LADEN 20 (2001) (noting that in 1998 Osama bin Laden told ABC News that “he made no 
distinction between American military and civilian targets, despite the fact that the Koran 
itself is explicit about the protections offered to civilians.”). 
 15 Jeffrey D. Simon, The Global Terrorist Threat, 82 PHI KAPPA PHI FORUM 10, 11 (2002). 
 16 Jayshree Bajoria & Greg Bruno, al-Qaeda (a.k.a.al-Qaida, al-Qa’ida), COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/publication/9126/ (last updated Aug. 29, 2011).   
 17 See e.g., Farhan Bokhari & Stephen Fidler, Rivalries Rife in Lair of Leaders, FIN. TIMES 
(London), July 5, 2007, at 5. 
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ed Kingdom, where radicalized British Muslims have established links with 
al-Qaeda- and Taliban-sponsored training camps in Pakistan.18 In continen-
tal Europe, home-grown terrorists have established links with radical cells 
in North Africa. 
Al-Qaeda’s current headquarters are believed to be the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (“FATA”) of Pakistan.19 Al-Qaeda has resisted 
the Pakistani Government’s efforts to suppress its activities in the FATA, 
and a 2006 peace arrangement between the Pakistani Government and the 
tribal chiefs may have allowed al-Qaeda more freedom to operate.20  
Indeed, on July 17, 2007, the White House released a National In-
telligence Estimate, which represents the consensus view of all 16 agencies 
that make up the American intelligence community.21 The report concluded 
that the U.S. was losing ground on a number of fronts in the fight against al-
Qaeda, and that the terrorist front had significantly strengthened over the 
past two years.22 One of the main reasons for al-Qaeda’s resurgence, ac-
cording to intelligence officials and White House aides, was the “hands-off 
approach toward the tribal areas by Pakistan’s [then] president, Gen. Pervez 
Musharraf.”23 As a result, American officials reportedly met and discussed 
“an aggressive new strategy, one that would include both public and covert 
elements” because of “growing concern that pinprick attacks on Qaeda tar-
gets were not enough. . . .”24 An aggressive new strategy was adopted, with 
the result that the U.S. engaged in substantial numbers of drone attacks in 
the FATA, as well as Special Forces operations, most spectacularly illus-
trated by the killing of Osama bin Laden by U.S. SEALs.25 
  
 18 See Stephen Fidler, Radicalising Wave Crosses the Atlantic, FIN. TIMES (London), July 
5, 2007, at 5. 
 19 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-622, COMBATING TERRORISM:  THE 
UNITED STATES LACKS COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO DESTROY THE TERRORIST THREAT AND 
CLOSE THE SAFE HAVEN IN PAKISTAN’S FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREA (2008), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08622.pdf. 
 20 See Bill Roggio, North Waziristan Peace Agreement Allows Al Qaeda to Remain, LONG 
WAR J. (June 8, 2008), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/06/north_waziristan 
_pea.php. 
 21 See Mark Mazzetti & David E. Sanger, Bush Advisers See A Failed Strategy Against Al 
Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2007, at A1, A6. 
 22 Id. at A1. 
 23 Id.  
 24 Id. at A6.  
 25 See Drone Attack in Pakistan: 2005–2011, S. ASIA TERRORISM PORTAL, http://www. 
satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Droneattack.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2012); 
see also Osama bin Laden is Dead, CBS NEWS (May 1, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2011/05/01/national/main20058777.shtml.  
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This aggressive new strategy against al-Qaeda and the Taliban is 
only one example of the impact of the new terrorism. There are many more, 
and it is time to turn to an examination of these.  
B. Impact of the New Terrorism  
Prior to the horrific attacks of September 11, 2001, international ter-
rorism had been treated primarily as a criminal law matter with emphasis 
placed on preventing the commission of the crime through intelligence or 
law enforcement means; or, if prevention failed, on the apprehension, pros-
ecution and punishment of the perpetrators. After September 11, however, 
the criminal justice approach was de-emphasized and to a considerable ex-
tent supplanted by the use of military means.26  
This shift to the military model of counter-terrorism has engendered 
considerable controversy. Supporters of the military model contend that 
criminal law is “too weak a weapon” and that it was inadequate to stop al-
Qaeda from planning and carrying out the attacks of September 11, 2001.27 
Critics argue that it is unnecessary and threatens fundamental human rights. 
They suggest that normal law enforcement measures can effectively combat 
the threat of terrorism.28 
A decision to employ the military model of counter-terrorism in 
place of the law enforcement model, or vice-versa, may have serious func-
tional consequences.29 For example, under the law enforcement model, it is 
impermissible to pursue and kill a suspected criminal before his capture 
unless it is necessary to do so as a matter of self-defense.
30
 The goal is to 
capture the suspect, subject him to trial in accordance with due process, and 
impose an appropriate sanction if he is convicted. In some cases, especially 
under U.S. law, this could include the death penalty. Under the military 
model, it is permissible to pursue the enemy with the intent to kill.31 Capture 
in place of killing is required only when the enemy has surrendered. If the 
enemy surrenders and qualifies as a prisoner of war, he will not be subject 
to sanction unless he has committed a war crime.32 He may, however, be 
detained until the end of the conflict to prevent him from returning to the 
  
 26 See Samantha Power, Our War on Terror, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., July 29, 2007, at 1.  
 27 See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, Combatants or Criminals? How Washington Should Handle 
Terrorists, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 126, 126 (2004). 
 28 See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 2 
(2004). 
 29 See Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 
466 (2002) (providing an especially thoughtful treatment of these distinct consequences). 
 30 Roth, supra note 28, at 2. 
 31 Feldman, supra note 29, at 468. 
 32 Id. 
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battlefield. If the law enforcement model applies, he normally cannot be 
detained after trial unless he has been convicted of a crime.33 Under normal-
ly applicable criminal law, moreover, conviction may be difficult because of 
the requirement that the crime be proved “beyond a reasonable doubt” and 
other barriers posed by criminal procedure and constitutional standards.  
The killing of Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011 raises in sharp re-
lief some of these issues, as well as a host of other important legal and polit-
ical issues.  
C. The Legality of the Killing of Osama bin Laden  
On May 2, 2011, U.S. Navy SEALs entered Pakistan—without the 
permission of Pakistan—to capture or kill Osama bin Laden.34 It is undis-
puted that the SEALs killed bin Laden in his heavily fortified Abbottabad 
compound, but there are conflicting reports about the circumstances sur-
rounding his death. According to one account, bin Laden’s twelve year-old 
daughter testified that the SEALs captured him alive but then shot him dead 
in front of family members.35 If the daughter’s claims are correct, the 
SEALs may have violated the prohibition in customary international law 
and in article 23(d) of the 1907 Hague Regulations against denial of quar-
ter.36  
According to the U.S. Government’s view, the circumstances sur-
rounding bin Laden’s death were such that it was not feasible to accept bin 
Laden’s offer of surrender, and indeed according to its version of the facts, 
there was no such offer of surrender. The U.S. claims that bin Laden resist-
ed the SEALs and appeared to be reaching for a weapon when he was shot 
and killed.37 
Some critics have applied a law enforcement or international human 
rights perspective to the situation, arguing that the U.S. should have cap-
  
 33 Id.; see also John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in 
Contemporary Conflicts:  Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing 
Law, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 201, 228–29 (2011) (discussing the time constraints set for detain-
ees after the conflict has ended). 
 34 Stephen M. Pezzi, The Legality of Killing Osama bin Laden, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. (May 
16, 2011), available at http://harvardnsj.com/2011/05/killing-osama-bin-laden-and-the-law/. 
 35 Mushtaq Yusufzai, Bin Laden’s Daughter Confirms her Father Shot Dead by US Spe-
cial Forces in Pakistan, AL ARABIYA NEWS (May 4, 2011), http://english.alarabiya. 
net/articles/ 2011/05/04/147782.html. 
 36 See Marty Lederman, The U.S. Perspective on the Legal Basis for the bin Laden Opera-
tion, OPINIO JURIS (May 24, 2011), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/24/the-us-perspective-on-
the-legal-basis-for-the-bin-laden-operation/. 
 37 See Differing Accounts Emerge of bin Laden Raid, MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.msn. 
com/id/42892575/ns/world_news-death_of_bin_laden/t/differing-accounts-emerge-bin-
laden-raid/#.Tm-oAOZK0gt (last updated May 4, 2011). 
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tured bin Laden and brought him to justice before a court.38 It is worth not-
ing, however, that even under the law enforcement or international human 
rights model, it is permissible to kill a criminal suspect if it is necessary to 
do so as a matter of self-defense. Hence, if it is true that bin Laden was re-
sisting arrest and appeared to be reaching for a weapon when he was shot—
even though no weapon was found on his body—it would arguably have 
been permissible for the SEALs to kill him.39 
There are two practical considerations that may have played a role 
in the decision to kill bin Laden, although the U.S. government does not 
appear to have referenced either in its official reports concerning the inci-
dent. First, severe time limitations impacted the SEAL operation. They had 
to escape from the compound before any Pakistani forces arrived, subduing 
and capturing bin Laden would have potentially put their entire operation in 
danger. Second, trying bin Laden before a federal court or a military com-
mission might have created immense political pressure in the face of reflex-
ive terrorist action. One might assume that al-Qaeda forces would have tak-
en a large number of hostages and started to kill them in order to force bin 
Laden’s release. Alternatively, al-Qaeda might have conducted an attack on 
the court itself. 
On May 6, 2011, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, and the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Schein, issued a statement 
regarding bin Laden’s death.40 In pertinent part, the statement read as fol-
lows: 
In respect of the recent use of deadly force against Osama bin Laden, the 
United States of America should disclose the supporting facts to allow an 
assessment in terms of international human rights law standards. For in-
stance, it will be particularly important to know if the planning of the mis-
sion allowed an effort to capture Bin Laden.
41
  
The Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State, Harold Koh, 
however, does not assess the killing of bin Laden in terms of international 
  
 38 See, e.g., Goran Slulter, Bin Laden is Innocent from a Legal Point of View, RADIO 
NETH. WORLDWIDE (May 5, 2011), http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/bin-laden-
innocent-a-legal-point-view. 
 39 Bin Laden Appeared to Be 'Reaching for a Weapon' Before Fatal Shot, Official Says, 
FOXNEWS.COM (May 3, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/05/03/official-guards-
bin-laden-compound-time-raid/. 
 40 See Osama bin Laden: Statement by the UN Special Rapporteurs on Summary Execu-
tions and on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMMISSIONER OF HUMAN RIGHTS (May 6, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/ 
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10987&LangID=E 519/2011. 
 41 Id.  
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human rights law.42 Rather, he assesses the killing under the law of armed 
conflict because, “the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, 
as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 
attacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense 
under international law.”43 As to whether the planning of the mission re-
quired an effort to capture bin Laden, Koh stated that: 
[C]onsistent with the laws of armed conflict and U.S. military doctrine, the 
U.S. forces were prepared to capture bin Laden if he had surrendered in a 
way that they could safely accept. The laws of armed conflict require ac-
ceptance of a genuine offer of surrender that is clearly communicated by 
the surrendering party and received by the opposing force, under circum-
stances where it is feasible for the opposing force to accept that offer of 
surrender. But where that is not the case, those laws authorize use of lethal 




The U.S. carried out the SEAL raid on the bin Laden compound 
without first informing Pakistan or obtaining its permission to enter the 
country. The reaction of the Pakistani government was sharp. In response, 
U.S. officials openly suggested that some Pakistani spies and soldiers may 
have shielded bin Laden. Pakistani officials warned of “disastrous conse-
quences” should the U.S. attempt similar action against other targets in Pa-
kistan.45 
A major legal issue which the Obama administration has not direct-
ly addressed is whether bin Laden’s assassination infringed upon Pakistani 
sovereignty in violation of international law. This should come as no sur-
prise, considering the tense relations between the U.S. and Pakistan in the 
wake of the raid.46 However, former U.S. government officials and some 
academics have defended the proposition that the raid did not violate the 
  
 42 See Harold Hongju Koh, The Lawfulness of the U.S. Operation Against Osama bin 
Laden, OPINIO JURIS (May 19, 2011), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/19/the-lawfulness-of-
the-us-operation-against-osama-bin-laden/. 
 43 Id.  
 44 Id. Contrary to this statement, it has been claimed that the Obama administration con-
sidered a variety of options before ordering the Navy SEALs into the compound, but that 
taking bin Laden alive was not one of them. It has also been suggested that the Obama ad-
ministration has adopted a policy of eliminating individual terrorists rather than attempting to 
take them alive and interrogate them as the Bush administration had. See, e.g., Yochi J. 
Dreazen, Aamer Madhani & Marc Ambinder, For Obama, Killing–Not Capturing–bin Laden 
was Goal, NAT’L J. (May 4, 2011), http://www.nationaljournal.com/for-obama-killing-not-
capturing-nobr-bin-laden-nobr-was-goal-20110503. 
 45 See, e.g., Matthew Rosenberg & Slobhan Gorman, Pakistan Detains Alleged Informant, 
WALL ST. J., June 16, 2011, at A13. 
 46 Lederman, supra note 36. 
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sovereignty of Pakistan contrary to international law.47 Assuming that the 
U.S. suffered armed attacks by al-Qaeda directed by its leader Osama bin 
Laden, Ashley Deeks notes that: 
Absent consent from the territorial state or authorization from the United 
Nations Security Council, international law traditionally requires the state 
that suffered the armed attack to assess whether the territorial state is “un-
willing or unable” to unilaterally suppress the threat. Only if the territorial 




Similarly, in a 2006 speech, when he was Legal Adviser of the De-
partment of State, John Billinger stated that: 
I am not suggesting that because we remain in a state of armed conflict 
with al Qaida, the United States is free to use military force against al Qai-
da in any state where an al Qaida terrorist may seek shelter. The U.S. mili-
tary does not plan to shoot terrorists on the streets of London. As a practi-
cal matter, though, a state must be responsible for preventing terrorists 
from using its territory as a base for launching attacks. And, as a legal mat-
ter, where a state is unwilling or unable to do so, it may be lawful for the 
targeted state to use military force in self-defense to address that threat.
49
 
In her article, Ashley Deeks argues that:  
[T]he United States appears to have strong arguments that Pakistan was 
unwilling or unable to strike against Bin Laden. Most importantly, the 
United States has a reasonable argument that asking the Government of 
Pakistan to act against Bin Laden could have undermined the mission. The 
size and location of the compound and its proximity to Pakistani military 
installations has cast strong doubt on Pakistan’s commitment to defeat al 
Qaeda. The United States seems to have suspected that certain officials 
within the Pakistani government were aware of Bin Laden’s presence and 
might have tipped him off to the imminent U.S. action if they had known 
about it in advance.
50
  
More recently, there has been increased evidence to support the 
proposition that Pakistan is unwilling or unable to prevent al-Qaeda from 
using its territory to launch armed attacks against U.S. troops and their al-
  
 47 See Ashley S. Deeks, Pakistan’s Sovereignty and the Killing of Osama Bin Laden, AM. 
SOC. INT’L L. INSIGHTS (May 5, 2011), available at http://www.asil.org/insights110505.cfm 
(thoroughly defending the proposition that the raid did not violate Pakistan’s sovereignty); 
see also Lederman, supra note 36.  
 48 Deeks, supra note 47.  
 49 John B. Bellinger III, Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism (Oct. 31, 2006) (transcript 
available at www2.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/pdf/20061031_JohnBellinger.pdf). 
 50 Deeks, supra note 47. 
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lies.51 Most damningly, reports by U.S. intelligence officers suggest that 
Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (“ISI”) ordered the killing 
in May 2011 of Saleem Shahzad, a journalist who had investigated connec-
tions between the ISI and militants.52 According to a U.S. intelligence offi-
cial, “[e]very indication is that this was a deliberate, targeted killing that 
was most likely meant to send shock waves through Pakistan’s journalist 
community and civil society.”53  
On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda’s attack on the U.S. killed nearly 
3,000 persons and constituted the most deadly terrorist attack in history. As 
R. James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence of the U.S. has 
noted, in speaking of today’s struggle against terror, the “first, and in many 
ways the dominating, issue with which one is faced is whether we are, pre-
dominately, at war or at peace.”54 He then states, correctly in my view:  
Clearly there are some elements of both in our current circumstances. But I 
would submit that much of our confusion is spawned by a hesitancy to 
acknowledge that we are in some key ways definitely at war, but not with 
the kind of enemy we are used to. Our hesitancy seems to me heavily driv-
en by the religiously-rooted nature of our enemy’s ideology.
55
 
Earlier in this essay, we have noted just how religiously-rooted is 
the nature of al-Qaeda’s ideology and some of the impact this ideology has 
had on U.S. efforts to combat international terrorism. Woolsey adds an ad-
ditional insight to the nature of al-Qaeda’s ideology when he states:  
  
 51 Marine Lieutenant General John Allen, nominated by President Barack Obama to lead 
the Afghanistan war, reportedly stated that “Pakistan, as a haven for militants, looms large 
over the war in Afghanistan. . . . [and] continues to ‘hedge’ against a precipitous U.S. with-
drawal from Afghanistan by supporting anti-American militant groups, including the 
Haqqani network.” Julian E. Barnes, Nominee Questions Pakistan’s Battle Plan, WALL ST. 
J., June 29, 2011, at A13. 
 52 Andrew Lebovich, Daily Brief: U.S. Officials Believe ISI Ordered Journalist Killed, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (July 5, 2011), http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/05/daily_brief_ 
us_officials_believe_isi_ordered_journalist_killed. 
 53 Jane Perlez & Eric Schmitt, Pakistan’s Spies Tied to Slaying of a Journalist, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/world/asia/05pakistan.html?pagewanted 
=all. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reportedly stated that he 
believed the government of Pakistan had “sanctioned” the kidnapping, torture and death of 
Saleem Shahzad. Admiral Mullen was the first American official to publicly accuse Pakistan 
of the killing. His comments were regarded as especially significant because he is one of the 
closest American officials to the Pakistani leadership, especially General Ashfaq Parvez 
Kayani, the chief of the Pakistani Army. See Elizabeth Bumuller, U.S. Admiral Ties Pakistan 
to Killing of Journalist, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011, at A4.   
 54 R. James Woolsey, Foreword, in LEGAL ISSUES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERROR vii, 
viii (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner, eds., 2010). 
 55 Id. 
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Lawrence Wright, in his definitive work, The Looming Tower, tells us that 
with just over ten per cent of the world’s Muslims Saudi Arabia controls 
around 90 per cent of the world’s Islamic Institutions. The beliefs es-
poused and taught by most of those institutions are essentially those of the 
Wahhabis, Saudi Arabia’s dominant sect of Islam—they are views that are 
somewhere between violent and genocidal with respect to Shi’ites, Jews, 
homosexuals, and apostates and highly repressive of women and many 
other groups. Their objective is to replace democratic government with a 
world-wide Caliphate—a theocratic dictatorship. These views are substan-
tially quite similar to al Qaeda’s. The principle [sic] difference between the 
two is not a matter of substance but the question of tactics and control, a 




As Woolsey points out, then, when it comes to practitioners of the 
“new terrorism,” the U.S. is clearly at war with a new type of enemy and is 
engaged in a distinctly different kind of war.  
III. THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR AND ITS IMPACT  
As is well known, the founders of the U.N. intended primarily to 
create an international institution that would be more effective in maintain-
ing international peace and security than the then-existing League of Na-
tions. In particular, the founders sought to prevent a recurrence of the appal-
ling carnage of World War II. They were willing to suppress by armed force 
aggression and other threats to or breaches of the peace.
57
  
World War II, of course, is a classic example of an international 
armed conflict between sovereign states. But international armed conflicts 
or wars58 currently constitute a small minority of all conflicts, and they have 
been in a steady decline for a much longer period.59 Wars have been re-
placed by internal or non-international armed conflicts in the form of insur-
gencies, civil wars and genocide.  
Some would say that the present armed conflict with al-Qaeda is an 
exception to this development, especially since al-Qaeda reportedly now 
operates in 100 countries. It is worth noting, however, that in Hamdan v. 
  
 56 Id. at ix. 
 57 See generally JOHN F. MURPHY, THE EVOLVING DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
HARD CHOICES FOR THE WORLD COMMUNITY 103–60 (2010). 
 58 For a variety of reasons beyond the scope of this essay, the use of the phrase “law of 
war” is far less common today. Rather, the primary choice is between “the law of armed 
conflict” and “international humanitarian law,” or the more neutral Latin phrase, “jus in 
bello.” See id. at 161. My own preference is for the law of armed conflict. 
 59 See HUMAN SECURITY CENTRE, THE HUMAN SECURITY REPORT 2005: WAR AND PEACE IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (2005). 
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Rumsfeld,60 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the assertion by the U.S. gov-
ernment that since al-Qaeda was not a state and had not accepted to be gov-
erned by the rules set forth in the Geneva Conventions, its affiliates could 
not invoke their protections. Rather, the Court held that the so-called “War 
on Terror” was a non-international armed conflict and that therefore at a 
minimum Article 3, which is common to all the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
applies to the conflict with al-Qaeda. The validity of this holding as a matter 
of international law is debatable, however, since, as Yoram Dinstein has 
argued, “from the vantage point of international law . . . a non-international 
armed conflict cannot possibly assume global dimensions.”61 Michael 
Schmitt buttresses this conclusion by noting that Common Article 3 itself 
defines the conflict to which it applies as “not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.”62  
Even the language Schmitt quotes from Common Article 3, howev-
er, has been subject to different interpretations. On the one hand, it can be 
interpreted as referring only to “internal” armed conflicts, that is, civil wars 
or insurgencies. This appears to be the interpretation Schmitt favors. On the 
other hand, it can be interpreted as referring more broadly to any armed 
conflict that is not between states. This appears to be the interpretation the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan favors. Under the latter approach, the 
phrase means occurring in the territory of “at least one of the High Con-
tracting Parties.”63 
Regardless of the appropriate classification of the armed conflict 
with al-Qaeda, the War on Terror is a classic example of asymmetric war-
fare. Although there are a number of possible definitions of asymmetric 
warfare,64 for present purposes, a definition by Professor Wolf Heinschel 
von Heinegg may be especially apt. According to Professor von Heinegg: 
[T]he term “asymmetric warfare” is to be understood as applying to armed 
hostilities in which one actor/party endeavors to compensate for its mili-
tary, economic or other deficiencies by resorting to the use of methods or 
  
 60 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–32 (2006). 
 61 See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 56 (2d ed. 2010). 
 62 Michael N. Schmitt, The United States Supreme Court and Detainees in the War on 
Terror, 37 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 33, 68 (2007). 
 63 See DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, & DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL AND 
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1060, 1063 (2010). 
 64 For an excellent and extensive discussion of “asymmetric conflict,” see MICHAEL L. 
GROSS, MORAL DILEMMAS OF MODERN WAR: TORTURE, ASSASSINATION, AND BLACKMAIL IN 
AN AGE OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT (2010). 
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means of warfare that are not in accordance with the law of armed conflict 
(or of other rules of public international law).
65
  
Examples of such methods or means of warfare would be the delib-
erate targeting of civilians, the slaughter of hostages, the embedding of 
fighters in the civilian population, and the use of human shields, especially 
civilians. What is particularly disturbing about asymmetric warfare is that 
violators of the law of armed conflict gain considerable military advantage 
in many instances by the adoption of such tactics because they can be ex-
tremely effective in countering the normally vastly superior military capa-
bilities of the other party.  
In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the enemy consists of insurgents who 
embed themselves into the civilian population, a clear violation of the law 
of armed conflict.66 In Iraq, a standard tactic of the insurgents was to use 
children as human shields in fire fights with U.S. and coalition forces.67 In 
Afghanistan, there have been sharp factual disputes between NATO and 
local residents over whether NATO air raids have resulted in civilian 
deaths, as alleged by the local residents, or, as contended by NATO, in the 
deaths of insurgents who had opened fire on NATO forces before they were 
killed.68 In May 2011, Afghan President Hamid Karzai issued what he 
called his “last” warning about civilian casualties. He reportedly told NATO 
  
 65 Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Asymmetric Warfare: How to Respond?, in 87 INT’L 
LAW STUDIES: INT’L LAW AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 463, 465–66 (Raul A. 
Pedrozo & Daria P. Wollschlaeger eds., 2011). 
 66 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War art. 28, Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. This convention provides that: 
“The presence of a protected person [civilian] may not be used to render certain points or 
areas immune from military operations.” See also Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I) art. 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.  
The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall 
not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in 
particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour 
or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the 
movement of the civilian population or individuals in order to attempt to shield 
military operations. 
Id. 
 67 Although the 46,000 U.S. troops currently stationed in Iraq are scheduled to leave by 
year’s end under a 2008 withdrawal agreement, and have largely limited their activities to 
training Iraq forces, they have been subject to heavy attack recently by Shiite militias sup-
ported by sophisticated weapons flowing from Iran into Iraq. June 2011, during which fifteen 
U.S. troops died, constituted the deadliest month for U.S. troops in Iraq in two years. See 
Lara Jakes, 2 U.S. Soldiers Die in Blast Linked to Iraqi Militias, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 8, 
2011, at A12. 
 68 See Alissa J. Rubin, More Attacks on Officials and a Protest Over a Deadly NATO 
Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2010, at A10. 
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to stop bombing Afghan homes, or it would face “unilateral action” from 
the Afghan government, and said it risked being viewed as a trespasser and 
occupying force.69  
The result of this controversy between NATO and President Karzai 
is that airstrikes in Afghanistan have been sharply curtailed and may be 
eliminated entirely. There is sharp debate within the military as to the prob-
able military impact of this limitation on air power.70   
As discussed above, Pakistan is unable or unwilling to close down 
al-Qaeda and Taliban bases in its FATA region. Because the bases serve as 
a jumping off point for attacks against NATO and Afghan forces in Afghan-
istan, the U.S. has resorted to the use of drone attacks and special operations 
forces such as Navy SEALs.71 On June 29, 2011, the Obama administration 
stated that al-Qaeda and its acolytes—including radicalized Americans—
remained the “preeminent security threat to the United States” even after 
Osama bin Laden’s death.72 John Brennan, the president’s chief counterter-
rorism adviser, reportedly said that the U.S. “seeks nothing less than the 
utter destruction of this evil that calls itself al Qaeda.”73 In keeping with this 
goal, the U.S. has reportedly expanded its drone attacks to cover both Soma-
lia and Yemen because of evidence that insurgents in the two countries are 
forging closer ties and possibly plotting attacks against the U.S.74  
  
 69 See Jack Healy, NATO Admits to Civilian Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011, at A11. 
 70 Charles Dunlap, a retired major general in the U.S. Air Force JAG, regards the decision 
in Afghanistan to sharply reduce the number of airstrikes as a serious mistake. He contends 
“it is often overlooked that during the surge [in Iraq], thousands of insurgents were captured 
or killed by American special operation forces and airstrikes. ‘I do believe, firmly, that the 
much-derided killing and capturing actually was the key to success.’” Julian E. Barnes, Bat-
tle Centers on Surge, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2010, at A9. In support of his argument Dunlap 
adds that “during the Iraq surge, airstrikes increased to five times previous levels in Afghani-
stan.” Id. U.S. military officers in Afghanistan counter these arguments by claiming that 
“special operations raids since last year have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of militant 
leaders,” while “the restrictions on airpower have saved Afghan lives and improved relations 
with the government.” Id. Others argue that in Iraq the Iraqis themselves were responsible for 
the reduction in violence: Sunni insurgents who turned against al-Qaeda, and Shiite militias 
who embraced a cease-fire with the Sunni. Id. For his part, James Dubik, a retired Lieutenant 
General who oversaw the training of the Iraqi military during the surge, reportedly stated: 
“The decisiveness of the surge came from an aggregate of factors—more like a thunderstorm 
than a single cause and effect.” Id. 
 71 See Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, Pakistan Arrests C.I.A. Informants in Bin Laden 
Raid, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011, at A1 (providing a recent report on the deterioration of 
U.S.-Pakistan relations).  
 72 Keith Johnson, Al Qaeda Remains Top Threat to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2011, at 
A4. 
 73 Id.  
 74 Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Expands its Drone War into Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 2, 2011, at A1. 
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Professor Michael L. Gross, in his recent study on asymmetric war-
fare, has highlighted the same goal of utter destruction of al-Qaeda, and the 
major concern of the U.S. with the ongoing efforts of terrorists to obtain 
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. As noted by 
Gross: 
Since the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, there is a 
growing understanding that asymmetric warfare includes the war on inter-
national terrorism. Unlike CAR conflicts [CAR conflicts are wars of na-
tional liberation, defined under Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I of 
1997 as struggles against “colonial domination, alien occupation, and rac-
ist regimes”], wars of international terror by such groups as al-Qaeda do 
not have a nationalist agenda nor are their operations confined to a particu-
lar geographic locale. On an immediate level, al-Qaeda and related groups 
hope to dislodge the United States and its allies from the Middle East and 
replace moderate Arab states with a fundamentalist Islamic regime. In the 
long term, they aim to undermine Western interests, destabilize the inter-
national order, and thereby lay the foundation for a radical, universal Islam 
and a revived caliphate.  
In this kind of asymmetric conflict, Western and moderate nation-states 
are arrayed against an international network of interlocking terrorist organ-
izations. Some of these organizations operate freely and independently 
while others affiliate closely with states that sponsor or support terrorism. 
Unlike CAR guerrillas, international terrorists do not represent any partic-
ular political constituency or territory. Nor is technological asymmetry al-
ways as clear and impressive as it is in CAR conflicts. On the contrary, in-
ternational terror organizations are generally better funded than CAR 
groups, so that the greater concern of many nations is the ongoing efforts 
of terrorists to obtain chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass 
destruction. The war on terror, unlike CAR conflicts, admits of no reason-
able political solution or compromise. The war is unremitting and long-
term and without obvious signposts of success, whether interim treaties, 
cease-fires, or territorial accommodations.
75
 
Many in the human rights community regard John Brennan’s goal 
of the “utter destruction” of al-Qaeda, especially through the use of drone 
attacks, as incompatible with international law. For example, in response to 
the killing of al-Qaeda leader Haitham al-Yemini with a CIA Predator drone 
attack in Pakistan in 2005, Amnesty International stated that, assuming the 
facts as it described them, the “USA has carried out an extrajudicial execu-
tion in violation of international law.”76 According to Anderson: 
  
 75 See GROSS, supra note 64, at 18–19. 
 76 Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law 14 
(Brookings Inst., Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., and the Hoover Inst., Counterterrorism and 
American Statutory Law Working Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415070 
(quoting Amnesty Int’l, USA, An Extrajudicial Execution by the CIA?, AI Index AMR 
 
File: Murphy 2 Created on: 4/3/2012 6:50:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:56:00 PM 
2011] CHALLENGES 77 
Amnesty believes that the governments of the “USA and Pakistan should 
have cooperated to arrest Haitham al-Yemeni rather than kill him.” The 
fundamental reason it gave was that whether or not this was part of an 
armed conflict, international human rights law continued to apply to this 
situation. Amnesty takes the position, in other words, that human rights 
law—including broad rights against arbitrary killing and guaranteeing due 
process—should have applied in this instance irrespective of whether it 
was an armed conflict or not. It is hard to see the circumstances in which a 




As Anderson points out at some length in his article, the U.S. cate-
gorically rejects this standard, on the grounds, among others, that the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not apply extraterrito-
rially and that it does not in any event apply in the setting of armed conflict, 
which is governed by the law of armed conflict as the lex specialis.78 The 
U.S. has steadfastly maintained this controversial position.  
Anderson has argued in another forum that the U.S. should not just 
rely on the law of armed conflict, i.e., the law of a non-international armed 
conflict, to defend its use of drones to kill individual terrorists.79 He warns 
that “any particular instance of targeted killing will most often aim at mini-
mum violence to kill a particular individual” and therefore not rise to the 
level of violence required for an armed conflict.80 This means that the U.S. 
might engage in uses of force that would not necessarily be part of an armed 
conflict in a technical sense. Anderson suggests that such uses of armed 
  
51/079/2005 (May 18, 2005), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/ 
079/2005/en/bafef6a3-d4ea-11dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/amr510792005en.pdf). 
 77 Id.  
 78 See id. at 13–14. 
 79 See Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate 
Whether There Is a ‘Legal Geography of War,’ in FUTURE CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND LAW (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2011), http://media.hoover.org/documents/Future 
Challenges_Anderson.pdf . 
 80 Id. at 6. Neither the Geneva Conventions nor Additional Protocol I contains a definition 
of an “armed conflict.” In contrast, Additional Protocol II defines non-international armed 
conflicts in such a way as to sharply limit the scope of the Protocol. See Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. Paragraph 1 of Article 
1 of Additional Protocol II applies to all armed conflicts not covered by Additional Protocol I 
and “which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces 
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible com-
mand, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sus-
tained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.” Id. Paragraph 2 of 
Article 1 of Additional Protocol II then provides that “[t]his Protocol shall not apply to situa-
tions of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of vio-
lence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.” Id.  
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force might be called “naked” self-defense.81 Examples include “self-
defense uses of force against nonstate actors, such as individual targets, 
which do not (yet) rise to the NIAC [non-international armed conflict] 
threshold.”82 
It is deeply ironic that international terrorists such as al-Qaeda have 
enjoyed considerable success in utilizing “lawfare” as a strategy against the 
U.S. and its allies, even as they regularly and unapologetically engage in 
methods of warfare that clearly violate the law of armed conflict. Major 
General Charles Dunlap of the U.S. Air Force JAG introduced the term 
“lawfare” in 2001.83 Today, Dunlap defines the term as “the strategy of us-
ing—or misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to 
achieve a warfighting objective.”84 We have previously seen a prime exam-
ple of this strategy in the claim by the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan 
that NATO has violated one of the fundamental norms of the law of armed 
conflict. That is, the requirement that armed forces distinguish between 
combatants and civilians during airstrikes.85 Yoram Dinstein, an eminent 
authority on the law of armed conflict, has explained how such a claim has 
no basis in law and constitutes, to the contrary, a misuse of the law:  
It is frequently glossed over (especially in the media) that LOAC [law of 
armed conflict] takes some collateral damage to enemy civilians virtually 
for granted as an inescapable consequence of attacks against lawful tar-
gets. Such damage is the case owing to the simple fact that lawful targets 
cannot be sterilized: some civilians and civilian objects will almost always 
be in proximity to combatants and military objectives. Hence a modicum 
of collateral damage to civilians cannot possibility be avoided unless a bat-
tle rages in the middle of the ocean or the desert (where no civilians or ci-
vilian objects are within range of the contact zone in which the belligerent 
parties are conducting attacks against each other).  
Far from imposing an all-embracing prohibition on collateral damage to 
enemy civilians and civilian objects, LOAC expressly permits it as long as 
(in the words of Additional Protocol I) it is not expected to be “excessive”, 
compared to the military advantage anticipated. This is the core of the 
principle of proportionality (the word “proportionality” itself is not men-
tioned as such in the Protocol). And “excessive”—we have to keep re-
minding ourselves—is not synonymous with “extensive.” Extensive civil-
  
 81 Anderson, supra note 76, at 8.  
 82 Id.  
 83 See generally Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Hu-
manitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Carr Ctr. for Human Rights, John F. Kennedy 
Sch. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., Working Paper, 2001), available at http://www.ksg.harvard. 
edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf. 
 84 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today . . . and Tomorrow, 87 INT’L LAW STUDIES: INT’L 
LAW AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 315, 315 (2011).  
 85 See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.  
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ian casualties (and damage to civilian objects), even when plainly ex-
pected, may be perfectly lawful when reasonably determined to be non-
excessive (on the basis of the information at hand at the time of action) 
once weighed against the military advantage anticipated.
86
 
It is worth noting, however, that, in another forum, Dinstein has 
acknowledged that there has always been a fundamental disconnect in bal-
ancing military considerations against civilian losses, because they are “dis-
similar considerations.”87 Similarly, another experienced practitioner of the 
law of armed conflict has noted that “[t]he rule is more easily stated than 
applied in practice.”88  
If balancing military considerations against civilian losses is diffi-
cult to do in combat, it is discouraging to realize, as pointed out by Dale 
Stephens, that “entirely lawful attacks within a theater of operations can 
result in popular resentment by those within that battlespace that translates 
into practical resistance.”89 This is currently the situation in Afghanistan. 
Moreover, as Yoram Dinstein has warned us: 
The notion of winning war by lawfare may appear to be far fetched. Yet, 
we must not underrate the potency of lawfare as a weapon of mass destruc-
tion—in this case, a weapon of mass disinformation—attuned to the pecu-
liarities of the era in which we live. Allegations of breaches of LOAC by 
our troops (usually magnified in propaganda to the scale of ‘atrocities’) 
tend to drive a wedge between our military community and the civil socie-
ty. When the public perception is that “atrocities” have been perpetrated by 
our troops, no victory in the field can repair the psychological damage 
done to the cause for which we are fighting.
90
  
The difficulties of succeeding in asymmetric armed conflicts with 
al-Qaeda and their ilk raise a temptation to respond with extreme measures 
such as torture, assassinations, and blackmail, a descent—in other words—
into barbarism. This temptation must be resisted. Rather, as Michael Gross 
has suggested, “[d]rawing the line between the acceptable and the unac-
ceptable, navigating the straits between military necessity and humanitarian 
  
 86 Yoram Dinstein, Concluding Remarks: LOAC and Attempts to Abuse or Subvert It, in 
87 INT’L LAW STUDIES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 463, 
465–66 (Raul A. Pedrozo & Daria P. Wollschlaeger eds., 2011) (citation omitted).  
 87 See DINSTEIN, supra note 61, at 122. 
 88 A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 20 (2nd ed. 2004).  
 89 Dale Stephens, The Age of Lawfare, in 87 INT’L LAW STUDIES: INT’L LAW AND THE 
CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 327, 332 (Raul A. Pedrozo & Daria P. Wollschlaeger eds., 
2011). 
 90 Dinstein, supra note 86, at 484.  
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imperatives while avoiding the pitfall of the slippery slope is the hard work 
of applied ethics during war.”91 
Another example of the changing nature of war that raises challeng-
es for international law and international institutions is the emergence of the 
so-called “Responsibility to Protect.” It is to this topic that we turn in the 
next section of this essay.  
A. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)  
There has long been a debate, at least in scholarly circles, over 
whether there is a doctrine of humanitarian intervention that is an exception 
to U.N. Charter limitations on the use of armed force.92 Regardless of which 
side to this debate has the better argument, it is clear that the responsibility 
to protect is different from the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. As 
José E. Alvarez has noted:  
The responsibility to protect concept was borne out of frustration with the 
international community’s repeated failures to intervene in cases of on-
going mass atrocity, in particular in Rwanda and Kosovo. The concept 
sought to deflect attention from the controverted “right” of some states to 
intervene, to the duties of all states to protect their own citizens from 
avoidable catastrophes and for third parties to come to the rescue.
93
  
As also noted by Alvarez, the concept was created and developed in 
greatest detail in the 2001 Report of the International Commission on Inter-
vention and State Responsibility, which was sponsored by the Canadian 
government.94 Alvarez further explains:  
As that Commission conceived it, the virtue of R2P was that it would en-
tice states to engage in humanitarian relief by shifting the emphasis from 
the politically unattractive right of state interveners to the less threatening 
idea of “responsibility.” R2P put the focus on the peoples at grave risk of 
harm rather than on the rights of states. It also stressed that responsibility 
was shared—as between the primary duty of states to protect their own 




 91 GROSS, supra note 64, at 252.   
 92 See generally JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 154–67 (2004) (discussing this issue in the context of NATO’s 
bombing in Kosovo, and for citations to articles taking both the pro and con sides).  
 93 José E. Alvarez, The Schizophrenias of R2P, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION AND THE 
USE OF FORCE 275, 275 (Philip Alston & Euan MacDonald eds., 2008).  
 94 See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001), available at www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-
Report.pdf.  
 95 Alvarez, supra note 93.  
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The Commission’s concept of R2P subsequently became part of 
several proposals for U.N. reform.96 Most significantly, the U.N. General 
Assembly adopted it in its 2005 World Summit Outcome document.97 In 
2006, the U.N. Security Council “reaffirmed” states’ “responsibility to pro-
tect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity.”98  
Well before the outbreak of the so-called “Arab Spring” and the 
armed conflict in Libya and the Ivory Coast, Alvarez suggested that: 
[T]here must be something wrong as well as right with an idea that can be 
endorsed by such strange bedfellows, and there is. R2P’s normative “legs” 
result from its not always consistent, various iterations as well as from the 
lack of clarity as to whether it is a legal or merely political concept. It 
means too many things to too many different people.
99
  
Perhaps the most significant issue arising from the various iterations 
of R2P is whether, in the absence of Security Council authorization, indi-
vidual states may invoke the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to pro-
tect populations in other states from the enumerated crimes. The report of 
the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change appears—
although it is not absolutely clear—to require Security Council authoriza-
tion for the use of armed force to protect persons from the enumerated 
crimes.100 There is little doubt that the International Commission on Inter-
vention and State Sovereignty viewed the Security Council “as the only 
legal source of authority (self-defense aside) for the use of force . . . .”101  
It is unclear, however, whether the World Summit Outcome docu-
ment requires Security Council authorization for the use of armed force 
under R2P. Paragraph 79 states “that the relevant provisions of the [U.N.] 
  
 96 See A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Rep. of the High-level Panel on 
Threats, 59th Sess., ¶¶ 201–03, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (December 2, 2004). (which refer to an 
“emerging norm of collective responsibility to protect”); U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger 
Freedom, Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. 
A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005). 
 97 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 
(Sept. 16, 2005); see also Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or 
Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99 (2007) (discussing the background to the 
World Summit Outcome). 
 98 S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).  
 99 The “strange bedfellows” referred to by Alvarez were the controversial John Bolton, 
then the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and the Non-Aligned Move-
ment. See Alvarez, supra note 93, at 277. 
100 See A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, supra note 96, ¶ 203; see also 
Stahn, supra note 97, at 105–07 (analyzing the High-level Panel’s position).  
101 Gareth Evans, foreign minister of Australia from 1988 to 1996, served as co-chair of the 
International Commission. GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 64 (2008). 
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Charter are sufficient to address the full range of threats to international 
peace and security. We further reaffirm the authority of the Security Coun-
cil to mandate coercive action to maintain and restore international peace 
and security.”102 Interpreting this language, Frederic L. Kirgis has suggested 
that the:  
leaders appear to be saying that no Charter amendments are needed in or-
der to enable the UN to deal with threats to the peace . . . that were not 
contemplated when the Charter was drawn up. Possibly, but not clearly, 
they were also saying that apart from uses of armed force expressly recog-
nized in the Charter (Security Council authorization under Chapter VII or 
self-defense in case of an armed attack), coercive action to deal with a 
threat to the peace could not be justified under the Charter.
103
  
Similarly, elsewhere in his ASIL Insight, Kirgis quotes paragraph 
139 of the Outcome document, where the world leaders stated that they: 
are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the UN Charter, includ-
ing Chapter VII, on a case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant 
regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inade-
quate and national authorities manifestly failing to protect their popula-
tions from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against hu-




He then notes that “[t]he legitimacy of humanitarian intervention 
without Security Council approval is controversial. Whether the world lead-
ers intended to address it in Paragraph 139 (or in Paragraph 79, discussed 
above) is unclear.”105  
At the time of this writing, the issue raised by Kirgis has not come 
up in practice. Instead, the Security Council has struggled with issues aris-
ing in connection with the extraordinary phenomenon known colloquially as 
the “Arab Spring.”  
  
102 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 97, ¶ 79.  
103 Frederic L. Kirgis, International Law Aspects of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Doc-
ument, AM. SOCIETY INT’L L. (Oct. 4, 2005), available at http://www.asil.org/insights051004. 
cfm#_edn2.  
104 Id.; 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 97, ¶139.  
105 Kirgis, supra note 103. 
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B. The Arab Spring  
Although the early 2011’s so-called “Arab Spring” was not the first 
example of a revolution sparked by social media and cell-phone texts,106 the 
eruption of demonstrations and revolutionary fervor in the Middle East set 
off by a Tunisian street vendor setting himself on fire in protest of police 
harassment is surely the most spectacular. Text messages and pictures of the 
street vendor’s self-immolation spread rapidly throughout the Middle East. 
Ultimately, the incident led to the removal of the leaders of Egypt and the 
outbreak of armed conflict in Libya, Yemen, the Ivory Coast and Syria. 
Demonstrations arose in Bahrain, Jordan and elsewhere. They also led to the 
Security Council taking action with respect to Libya and the Ivory Coast 
that, at least arguably, constituted the first exercises of the Responsibility to 
Protect.  
Reacting quickly to the outbreak of armed conflict in Libya and to 
reports of the use of force by the Libyan government against civilians, the 
U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 on February 
26, 2011.107 In its preamble, Resolution 1970 expressed grave concern at the 
situation in Libya, condemned the violence and use of force against civil-
ians, considered that these attacks might amount to crimes against humani-
ty, and recalled the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its popula-
tion. Acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and taking measures 
under Article 41 of the Charter,108 the Council expressed the hope that those 
responsible for these crimes would be brought before the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”). The Council referred the matter to the ICC’s Pros-
ecutor and imposed sanctions against Colonel Gadhafi, as well as his ac-
  
106 According to Clay Shirky, the first time that social media had helped to force out a 
national leader was when Philippine President Joseph Estrada was removed from office in 
2001. Clay Shirky, The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and 
Political Change, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 28, 28 (2011). In response to a vote by the Philippine 
Congress during the impeachment trial of Estrada to set aside key evidence against him, 
within two hours after the vote, thousands of Filipinos took to the streets in protest. Id. En-
couraged in part by close to seven million text messages during the week, the crowd grew in 
several days to over a million people, choking traffic in downtown Manila. Id. The Philip-
pine Congress reversed its vote and Estrada was gone. Id.  
107 S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).  
108 Article 41 of the U.N. Charter provides: 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include com-
plete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, tele-
graphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations.  
U.N. Charter art. 41.  
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complices and members of his family, and imposed an embargo on arms 
destined for Libya.  
It is perhaps surprising that the Security Council unanimously de-
cided to refer the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court, in light of the uproar that broke out in reaction to the 
Court’s issuance of arrest warrants against Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, the 
President of the Sudan.109 Indeed, Resolution 1970 is a bit schizophrenic on 
the referral because in its preamble the resolution recalls, “Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute [the charter of the ICC] under which no investigation or pros-
ecution may be commenced or proceeded with by the International Criminal 
Court for a period of 12 months after a Security Council request to that ef-
fect.”110 There was an effort after the ICC issued its arrest warrants against 
Al-Bashir to get the Security Council to take action under Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute, but the threat of a U.S. and British veto blocked the adoption 
of any such action.111 Despite the ICC’s difficulties with respect to the arrest 
warrants it issued against Al-Bashir, the International Criminal Court’s Pre-
Trial Chamber I issued arrest warrants against Muammar Gaddafi, Seif al-
Slam Gadhafi, his son, and Abdullah Senussi, the chief of military intelli-
gence and Muammar Gaddafi’s brother-in-law on June 27, 2011. The war-
rants pertained to crimes against humanity—murder and persecution—
allegedly committed in Libya from February 15, 2011 until at least February 
28, 2011.112 
The sanctions against the Libyan government and the threat of ac-
tion by the ICC failed to halt the Libyan government’s attacks on its popula-
tion, leading the Security Council to adopt Resolution 1973 on March 17, 
2011.113 In that resolution, the Council authorized the use of armed force 
against the Libyan government and thereby created a major challenge for 
itself, raising crucial questions regarding the operational viability of the 
Responsibility to Protect.  
Before considering Resolution 1973 in more detail, it is important 
to note that prior to consideration of the resolution in draft form, the League 
of Arab States called on the Security Council to establish a no-fly zone in its 
own resolution on March 12, 2011.114 It is also important to note that de-
  
109 For a brief discussion of this reaction, see John F. Murphy, Gulliver No Longer Quiv-
ers: U.S. Views on and the Future of the International Criminal Court, 44 INT’L L. 1123, 
1136–37 (2010).  
110 S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 107. 
111 See Murphy, supra note 109, at 1137. 
112 Bruce Zagaris, ICC Issues Three Arrest Warrants for Gaddafi and Two Others, 27 INT’L 
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 888, 888 (2011).  
113 S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
114 As noted by Alain Juppé, the Foreign Minister of France, in a statement to the Security 
Council before the vote on Resolution 1973. See U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6498th mtg., at 2, 
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spite this unanimous request by the League of Arab States, Resolution 1973 
was adopted by the narrowest of margins, with five member states of the 
Council—Brazil, China, Germany, India, and the Russian Federation—
abstaining in the vote.115 In his statement before the vote, Alain Juppé, the 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, highlighted the most important provi-
sions of the then draft resolution: 
The draft resolution provides the Council with the means to protect the ci-
vilian populations in Libya, first by establishing a no-fly zone and by au-
thorizing the members of the Arab League and those Member States [of 
the U.N.] that so wish to take the measures necessary to implement its 
provisions. Furthermore, it authorizes these same States to take all 
measures necessary, over and above the no-fly zone, to protect civilians 
and territories, including Benghazi, which are under the threat of attack by 
Colonel Al-Qadhafi’s forces. Lastly, it strengthens the sanctions that have 
been adopted against the regime, including implementing the arms embar-




All five of the member states of the Security Council who abstained 
in the vote on Resolution 1973 made statements in explanation of their ab-
stentions.117 All of their statements indicated that the abstainers had prob-
lems with Resolution 1973's authorization of the use of armed force to im-
plement the no-fly zone and especially with the resolution’s authorization of 
“all measures necessary, over and above the no-fly zone, to protect civil-
ians. . . .”118 The representative of the Russian Federation made an especial-
ly strong statement against the use of force. Favoring a peaceful settlement 
of the situation in Libya, the representative noted, “However, the passion of 
some Council members for methods involving force prevailed. This is most 
unfortunate and regrettable. Responsibility for the inevitable humanitarian 
  
U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498 (Mar. 17, 2011). Also, in its preamble, Resolution 1973 takes note of 
“the decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 12 March 2011 to call for the 
imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places 
exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan peo-
ple and foreign nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.” S.C. Res. 1973, supra 
note 113.  
115 See U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498, supra note 114, at 3. Member states voting in favor were 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Columbia, France, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, South Afri-
ca, the U.K., and the U.S. Id. The ten votes in favor of the resolution were one more than the 
nine votes, including the concurring votes of all the permanent members, required by Article 
27 (3) of the U.N. Charter. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3. 
116 U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498, supra note 114, at 3.  
117 Id. at 4–6, 8, 10 (Germany, India, Brazil, Russian Federation, China).   
118 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 113, ¶ 3. 
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consequences of the excessive use of outside force in Libya will fall fair and 
square on the shoulders of those who might undertake such action.”119  
At the time of this writing, unknown gunmen have assassinated the 
Libyan rebels’ leader, General Abdul Fattah Younes, along with two col-
leagues. According to reports, “[n]early every detail of the killings seems to 
be in dispute.”120 In particular, it is unclear whether Younes was killed by 
agents of Gadhafi or by persons in one of the dozens of armed rebel militias 
who distrust Younes due to his previous position as a trusted lieutenant of 
Gadhafi. Relatives and members of Younes’ tribe have warned of dire con-
sequences, including violence, if rebel leaders do not move quickly to find 
his killers. 
Younes’s killing also has focused more attention on not just wheth-
er Gadhafi will be toppled but what will follow him if he is. As stated by 
two commentators on the current situation: 
Libya’s fate matters not just for a population estimated before the war at 
6.5m and for the credibility of western countries that have backed the re-
bels. It is also crucial for the future of the Arab spring. This has darkened 
since the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents were forced from office largely 
peacefully in January and February, with protracted violence seen since in 
Libya, Syria and Yemen. Today those opposing Middle East regimes, not 
least in Syria—where more than 100 people are thought to have died in the 
past few days alone in a violent government crackdown—will be looking 
to Libya to see if an armed uprising can work. Repressive governments in 




The fate of the Arab Spring is impossible to predict at this point, 
and is beyond the scope of this essay.122 However, it is worthwhile to con-
sider the international community’s actions in Libya with respect to R2P. 
First, it is debatable whether the primary motivation behind the Security 
Council’s adoption of Resolution 1973 was to protect the citizens of Libya. 
As noted above, the five states that abstained on the resolution, especially 
China and the Russian Federation, both permanent members of the Security 
Council, were extremely uncomfortable with Resolution 1973's authoriza-
tion of a no-fly zone and related measures going beyond a no-fly zone if 
they were necessary to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under 
  
119 U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498, supra note 114, at 8.  
120 Kareem Fahim, Killing of General Vexes Rebels in Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2011, at 
A6. 
121 Michael Peel & Simeon Kerr, Uneasy Seat of Power, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2011, at 5.  
122 For a pessimistic analysis of the Arab Spring’s fate, see Richard Haass, The Arab Spring 
and the Long, Hot Summer, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at 9. Richard Haass is currently presi-
dent of the Council on Foreign Relations and former director of policy planning at the U.S. 
Department of State (2001–03).  
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threat of attack.123 It seems highly likely that China and the Russian Federa-
tion refrained from blocking the resolution because the Arab League had 
unanimously called for a no-fly zone and because neither state wished to 
offend the Arab states because of various important interests in the Middle 
East. Nonetheless, one should note that Resolution 1973 explicitly excludes 
“a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory,”124 
and all states agreed that no foreign ground troops would be called to action 
in Libya.125 As a result, the conflict in Libya is currently at a stalemate de-
spite many air raids by coalition forces. One may doubt that the effort to 
protect the civilians of Libya from attacks by Gadhafi’s forces has been 
successful. Further, nothing has been done to protect civilians from rebel 
attacks, and there are reports of rebel forces committing numerous atrocities 
against civilians in areas that were previously under the control of Gadhafi 
forces.126  
In short, perhaps Richard Haass was correct to suggest that “the 
most important lessons from the Arab spring remain the simplest. Military 
intervention should, as a rule, be avoided. It is easier to oust a regime than it 
is to help put something better in its place. Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya all 
stand as warnings.”127  
The situation in the Ivory Coast is, of course, not part of the Arab 
Spring. It is, however, arguably the only other situation in which the Securi-
ty Council took action as an exercise of the R2P.  
C. The Ivory Coast and R2P  
As the background to the situation in the Ivory Coast is complex 
and has been set forth elsewhere, it suffices to merely highlight a few key 
developments for present purposes.128 In particular, one should note that in 
an effort to end internal armed conflict, Ivorian political forces signed an 
  
123 See U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498, supra note 114, at 8–10.  
124 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 113, ¶ 4. 
125 See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on 
Libya (Mar. 28, 2011), available at http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28 
/remarks-president-address-nation-libya.  
126 Human Rights Watch has reportedly claimed that rebels in the mountains in Libya’s 
west have looted and damaged four towns seized from the forces of Colonel Gadhafi, as part 
of a series of abuses and apparent reprisals against suspected loyalists that have chased resi-
dents of these towns away. See C.J. Chivers, Libyan Rebels Accused of Pillage and Beatings 
in Towns They Captured, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2011, at A11.    
127 Haass, supra note 122, at 10. 
128 See generally Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams, The New Politics of Protection? 
Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, 87 INT’L AFF. 825 (2011) (using the 
case study of Côte d’Ivoire to show changes in the international attitudes towards the respon-
sibility to protect doctrine). 
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agreement in Linas-Marcoussis on January 24, 2003.129 For its part, the Se-
curity Council created an international peacekeeping force to oversee the 
implementation of the agreement: the United Nations Operation in Cote 
d’Ivoire (“UNOCI”).130 The mandate of UNOCI included the protection of 
“civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,”131 and it was author-
ized to use “all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabili-
ties and its areas of deployment.”132 Unfortunately, UNOCI proved to have 
insufficient capabilities to protect civilians, even though it was supported by 
several thousand French soldiers stationed in the Ivory Coast prior to the 
outbreak of armed conflict.133 The crucial phase of the conflict, however, 
arose after the principal parties disputed the results of the long-postponed 
presidential election of November 28, 2010. This resulted in renewed armed 
conflict between the supporters of the incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo 
and his challenger, Alassane Ouattara. When early election returns suggest-
ed Ouattara’s victory, Gbagbo’s representatives prevented dissemination of 
the result. “In the meantime, the Constitutional Council [of the Ivory Coast] 
declared that that there had been massive vote-rigging in the north.”134 It 
cancelled 660,000 votes for Ouattara, handing Gbagbo the victory.135 Based 
on a briefing from the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for the 
Ivory Coast, however, who insisted that Ouattara had won, the Security 
Council adopted a resolution formally supporting this view and urging the 
parties to accept this result.136  
The parties did not accept this result, however, and the situation de-
teriorated further, with an increase in violence. In response, on March 30, 
2011, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1975.137 The 
resolution recognized Ouattara as president, condemned Gbagbo’s refusal to 
negotiate a settlement, and authorized UNOCI to “use all necessary means” 
  
129 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, transmitted by letter dated January 27, 2003 from the 
Permanent Representative of France to the U.N. addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/99 (Jan. 27, 2003). 
130 See S.C. Res. 1528, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004) (establishing UNOCI). 
131 Id. ¶ 6(i). 
132 Id. ¶ 8. 
133 See Bellamy & Williams, supra note 128, at 829. 
134 Id. at 832 
135 Id. 
136 See S.C. Res. 1962, ¶ 1,U.N. Doc. S/RES/1962, at 2 (Dec. 20, 2010). 
137 S.C. Res. 1975, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1975, at 1 (Mar. 30, 2011) (“Expressing grave con-
cern about the recent escalation of violence in Côte d’ Ivoire and the risk of relapse into civil 
war and urging all parties to show utmost restraint to prevent such outcome and to resolve 
their differences peacefully.”). 
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to protect civilians, including by “prevent[ing] the use of heavy weapons 
against the civilian population.”138  
Although the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
1975, members presented sharply different interpretations of the text. For 
example, the representative of the United Kingdom noted that the resolution 
reaffirmed the “robust mandate” of UNOCI to use “all necessary means” to 
protect civilians and recognizes the need to prevent “the use of heavy weap-
ons against civilians.”139 By contrast, the representative of China stated that 
it “always believes that United Nations peacekeeping operations should 
strictly abide by the principle of neutrality.”140 India, for its part, contended 
that U.N. peacekeepers “cannot be made instruments of regime change.”141  
Despite these interpretations of Resolution 1975 by the Chinese and 
Indian representatives, UNOCI, aided by French forces, used military force 
to engage in regime change.142 They defeated Gbagbo forces in April 2011. 
U.N. Peacekeepers arrested him without French assistance.143 As noted by 
Bellamy and Williams: 
This use of force by UN peacekeepers and French troops blurred the lines 
between human protection and regime change and raised questions about 
the role of the UN in overriding Côte d’Ivoire’s Constitutional Council, 
about the proper interpretation of Resolution 1975, and about the place of 
neutrality and impartiality in UN peacekeeping.
144
  
The Russian Federation and Thabo Mbeki, the former president of 
South Africa, sharply criticized the UNOCI and French operation.145 As in 
the case of Libya and Resolution 1973, it appears that the Security Council 
would not have adopted Resolution 1975 in the absence of strong support 
  
138 Id. ¶ 6.  
139 U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6508th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6508 (Mar. 30, 2011). 
140 Id. at 7.  
141 Id. at 3.  
142 Steven Erlanger, French Colonial past Casts Long Shadow over Policy in Africa, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2011, at A10. 
143 Id. 
144 See Bellamy & Williams, supra note 128, at 835.  
145 Id. Thabo Mbeki, who argued that the UN had overstepped its authority by overriding 
the Constitutional Council, that Ban Ki-moon had exceeded his mandate by declaring Ouat-
tara to be the winner of the elections, and that UNOCI had fallen short of its mandate by 
failing to prevent or stop ceasefire violations by the Forces Nouvelles and then by failing to 
protect civilians in Duékoué. The source of these failings, he maintained, lay in the aban-
donment of impartiality by the UN and the undue influence exerted by France. The Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also criticized the role played by the UN, arguing that ‘UN 
peacekeepers and supporting French forces in Côte d’Ivoire have started military action, 
taking the side of Ouattara, carrying out air strikes on the positions held by supporters of 
Gbagbo.” Id. 
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for forceful action from regional organizations, in this case the Economic 
Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”) and the African Union.146 
Once again, it appears that political interests rather than humanitarian con-
cerns were the motivating factors behind the actions of the Security Coun-
cil.  
At the time of this writing, the situations in Libya and the Ivory 
Coast continue to unfold. Concurrently, the Syrian government has engaged 
in widespread attacks on protestors against the regime of President Bashir 
al-Assad, presenting another difficult challenge with respect to R2P for the 
international community.147 On August 3, 2011, after months of diplomatic 
wrangling, the Security Council approved a statement by the President of 
the Security Council.148 In the statement, the Council “condemn[ed] the 
widespread violations of human rights and the use of force against civilians 
by the Syrian authorities” and called for “an immediate end to all violence 
and urges all sides to act with utmost restraint, and to refrain from reprisals, 
including attacks against state institutions.”149 The U.S. and its allies on the 
Council had reportedly sought a resolution that would create binding obliga-
tions on Syria and others. Syria’s opposition had lobbied Western nations 
intensely for a resolution that would refer the situation in Syria to the Inter-
national Criminal Court. But the Russian Federation made clear it would 
veto a resolution, which also was opposed by China, Brazil, India and South 
Africa.150 How this crisis is resolved will determine the future of Syria and 
perhaps of R2P as well.  
A final emerging change in the nature of armed conflict is the threat 
of cyber combat. A complete examination of that topic is beyond the scope 
of this essay, but cyber combat clearly poses challenges to international law 
and international institutions. The U.S. Department of Defense has conclud-
ed that state-sponsored computer sabotage can, under certain circumstances, 
constitute an act of war, to which the U.S. could respond with traditional 
  
146 Bellamy and Williams report that “ECOWAS had suspended Côte d’Ivoire’s member-
ship, called on Gbagbo to step aside and threatened that it might ‘use . . . legitimate military 
force’ if he did not. . . .” Id. at 834. But he called their bluff, and “its political leaders were 
well aware that they were in no position to mount an effective military intervention and 
instead called for the UN Security Council to take more forceful action.” Id. Moreover, in its 
preamble, Resolution 1975 welcomes “the decision of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union . . . which reaffirms all its previous decisions on the rapidly deteriorating post-
electoral crisis facing Côte d’Ivoire since the second round of the presidential election, on 28 
November 2010, which recognize the election of Mr Alassane Dramane Ouattara as the 
President of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire.” S.C. Res. 1975, supra note 137, at 1. 
147 See Joe Lauria & Nour Malas, U.N. Condemns Syria as Hama Shelled, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 4, 2011, at A6. 
148 S.C. Pres. Statement 2011/16, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2011/16 (Aug. 3, 2011). 
149 Id. 
150 See Lauria & Malas, supra note 147. 
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military force.151 Although defense officials refuse to discuss potential cyber 
adversaries, some experts have identified China as condoning these types of 
attacks.152 One should note, however, that cyber-attacks might also come 
from individual terrorists or terrorist organizations, especially in light of the 
increased technological competence of the new terrorism.153 The concept is 
increasingly becoming the focus of considerable attention.154 
IV. CONCLUSION  
It is my hope that the foregoing discussion of the challenges posed 
by the new terrorism and the changing nature of war or armed conflict has 
demonstrated that these challenges have indeed created a major crisis for 
international law and international institutions, especially with respect to 
efforts to combat international terrorism. Profound changes have occurred 
with great rapidity over the last decade, and international law and interna-
tional institutions have struggled, often in vain, to keep up.  
A major contributor to this crisis is the inability of the major play-
ers—states, NGOs, international organizations, and academics—to agree on 
the nature of the challenges, or even of their existence, much less on the 
steps that should be taken to meet them. The debates have been fierce, not 
only between or among these major players, but also between the decision 
makers within the major players. For example, there have been major de-
bates within the Obama administration on how to react to the R2P situa-
tion.155 Hillary Clinton, U.S. Secretary of State, has reportedly indicated 
how difficult she finds the decision making process on this issue:  
  
151 Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War—Pentagon Sets Stage 
for U.S. to Respond to Computer Sabotage with Military Force, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2011, 
at A1. 
152 See, e.g., Richard Clarke, China’s Cyberassault on America, WALL ST. J., June 15, 
2011, at A15. 
153 See generally John F. Murphy, Computer Network Attacks by Terrorists: Some Legal 
Dimensions, in 76 INT’L LAW STUDIES: COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 323 (Michael N. Schmitt & Brian T. O’Donnell eds., 2002) (providing an early discus-
sion of this possibility). 
154 See Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber Attacks as “Force” under UN Charter Article 2(4), 87 
INT’L LAW STUDIES: INT’L LAW AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 43 (Raul A. Ped-
rozo & Daria P. Wollschlaeger eds., 2011), Sean Watts, Low-Intensity Computer Network 
Attack and Self-Defense, 87 INT’L LAW STUDIES: INT’L LAW AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER 
OF WAR 59 (Raul A. Pedrozo & Daria P. Wollschlaeger eds., 2011), and Michael N. Schmitt, 
Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issue, 87 INT’L LAW STUDIES: INT’L LAW AND 
THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 89 (Raul A. Pedrozo & Daria P. Wollschlaeger eds., 
2011) for recent consideration of the possibility of cyber-attacks from individual terrorists or 
terrorist organizations. 
155 See Ryan Lizza, The Consequentialist, NEW YORKER, May 2, 2011, at 44. 
File: Murphy 2 Created on:  4/3/2012 6:50:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:56:00 PM 
92 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:59 
I get up every morning and I look around the world. . . . People are being 
killed in Cote d’Ivoire, they’re being killed in the Eastern Congo, they’re 
being oppressed and abused all over the world by dictators and really un-
savory characters. So we could be intervening all over the place. But that 
is not a—what is the standard? Is the standard . . . a leader who won’t 
leave office in Ivory Coast and is killing his own people? Gee, that sounds 
familiar. So part of it is having to make tough choices and wanting to help 
the international community accept responsibility.
156
  
Helping the international community accept responsibility is not an 
easy task, however, because, as we have seen previously in this essay, Chi-
na, the Russian Federation, India, Brazil, and South Africa, to name a few, 
perceive R2P quite differently than the U.S. and other Western nations. 
Similarly, sharp disagreements exist as to the steps that should be taken to 
meet challenges arising in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Soma-
lia.  
These and other challenges discussed in this essay must be faced, 
and efforts continued to reach agreement on how to meet them. Otherwise, 
the current crisis in international law and international institutions will only 
worsen, with all the serious consequences this will entail. 
 
  
156 Id. at 55. 
